U.S. supermajor Chevron has moved from open-ended negotiations under its previous USD200 million exclusivity window to finalising commercial terms for Iraq’s supergiant West Qurna 2 oilfield. Whilst the American firm originally had until February 2027 to use its one-year exclusivity window, following a very recent meeting between Iraqi Oil Minister Basim Mohammed Khudair Al-Abadi and Chevron’s vice president of business development Joe Cook, the two sides confirmed that contract terms for West Qurna 2 have now been agreed. As it stands, they expect a formal signing of the landmark deal for the huge oilfield before 31 December this year -- two months ahead of the expiry of Chevron’s exclusive negotiating window. So, why has the deal moved so fast now, and what makes it so special?
Key to the sudden acceleration from Baghdad’s side was the personal intervention of Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister for Energy Affairs Mohsen al-Mandalawi during the November visit to the country of a delegation from Chevron, a senior source who works closely with Iraq’s Oil Ministry exclusively told OilPrice.com last week. “He [al-Mandalawi] told the Iraqi negotiators just to get on with it, specifically to remove any unnecessary obstacles, because the government wants the whole thing wrapped up as soon as possible, preferably this month [November],” he said.
“Even more specifically, he [al-Mandalawi] said that the negotiators should stop focusing on trying to tie Chevron into doing the development deal for the Nassiriya oilfield at the same pace as they wanted to get moving with the West Qurna 2 site, so it was agreed that the Nassiriya negotiations could move ahead separately at a slower pace, while the West Qurna 2 deal just went ahead anyway,” he added. “This also tied in with earlier preparations that had been laid to allow Chevron to get up to speed on the West Qurna 2 development requirements, as seen in the mid-September signing of a technical consultancy contract by the Oil Ministry that allowed Chevron to advise the state-run Basra Oil Company (BOC) on elements relating to the field, as the BOC has operated West Qurna 2 since Lukoil effectively pulled out last November,” he underlined.
“The [West Qurna 2] field’s in great shape, and the benefits to both sides in the deal should become apparent very quickly,” the source added. Indeed, West Qurna 2 remains a jewel in the crown of Iraq’s spectacular array of oilfields, located just 65 kilometres northwest of the southern port of Basra and with roughly 14 billion barrels of reserves in place. Whilst Lukoil had been developing it, the field had steadily been producing around 400,000 barrels per day (bpd) -- about nine per cent of Iraq’s total oil production at that time. However -- and crucially for what happens next for Iraq and for Chevron -- the field had already proven able to produce much more oil than the Russian firm had ever officially divulged, as exclusively revealed by OilPrice.com at the time.
More specifically, Lukoil had in fact hit 650,000 bpd production over extended periods in August and September 2017 but had not told the Oil Ministry, as it hoped to use this foreknowledge as a means of negotiating a better per-barrel rate for a contract upgrade with little further effort from itself, as analysed in full in my latest book on the new global oil market order. At that point, Lukoil was being paid USD1.15 per barrel recovered -- the lowest rate being paid to any international oil company (IOC) in Iraq at that point and dwarfed by the USD5.50 per barrel being paid to fellow Russian driller GazpromNeft in its development of the Badra oil field. Making matters worse for Lukoil at that point was that it had already spent at least USD8 billion in developing West Qurna 2, and compounding this grievance was the fact that Iraq’s Oil Ministry still owed it around USD6 billion in remuneration on recovered barrels and other development payments.
Consequently, it is exceptionally likely that Chevron can increase production at West Qurna 2 to at least the 635,000 bpd that Lukoil did for very extended periods (the 650,000 bpd was achieved on shorter, but still extended, runs) within a very quick timeframe from starting work on the field. Indeed, given this already established baseline output, the Oil Ministry is quietly confident that the U.S. will be able to dramatically expand West Qurna 2’s production beyond the 635,000-bpd level permanently. Under Lukoil’s original contract, peak production at the field was seen as 1.2 million bpd, after being scaled down from an earlier initial figure of 1.8 million bpd. OilPrice.com understands from the Oil Ministry source that the working figure for the field’s peak production now is 800,000 bpd, although secretly the Ministry believes much more can be achieved -- nearer the 1.2 million bpd in Lukoil’s contract, in fact.
Three reasons lie at the heart of Iraq’s sudden sense of urgency on securing this deal with Chevron. First, Baghdad needs all the oil output it can get to generate income for the government as fast as possible. No country, aside from Iran itself, has felt the economic consequences of the U.S./Israel-Iran war more than Iraq, with over 90 percent of its annual budget historically having come from oil and around 95 percent of that historically having had to pass through the Strait of Hormuz before it could be monetised. When Iran closed the strait on the first day of ‘Operation Epic Fury’, that vital oil transit route was shut to neighbouring Iraq, and its critical financial lifeline along with it. It is true that October saw Iraq’s nationwide crude production rebound to 4.22 million bpd, with 3.95 million bpd coming from the Federal Government of Iraq region in the south under Baghdad’s direct jurisdiction. It is also true that, in turn, crude oil exports surged 9.5% month-on-month, averaging between 3.35 million bpd and 3.5 million bpd. However, it also remains the case that Iraqi Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein stated in mid-October 2026 that the country had lost approximately USD60 billion in overall oil export revenues due to the Strait of Hormuz closure on its own, while Iraq’s budget deficit soared 346 percent in the first nine months of the year, driven by a 50.8 percent year-on-year drop in oil revenues.
The second reason why the Chevron deal has been expedited by Iraq is that the firm remains a leader in technology, operational expertise, and financing ability in its field, which Baghdad needs right now more than ever. That is because the lack of shipping options after the closure of the Strait of Hormuz meant that Iraq’s storage facilities for drilled oil were full. This led to it having to shut down many production wells entirely, threatening permanent damage to them through a loss of reservoir pressure, water infiltration, and corrosion, among other factors. Consequently, this is no time for Baghdad to be working with companies who cannot provide the very best chance of oil production being maximised in a sustainable way from the country’s biggest sites.
Iranian firms have proven incapable of handling their country’s own oilfields in such a manner, given the long-running sanctions on them, and Russian firms have fallen into the same bracket now too. Meanwhile, Chinese firms have long struggled to match the impact of U.S. firms in being able to develop either Iranian or Iraqi oilfields to their optimal potential, as also detailed in my latest book on the new global oil market order.
The third and final reason why Iraq wants the Chevron-West Qurna 2 deal wrapped up quickly is that the U.S. firm effectively functions in part as a corporate proxy for Washington that the U.S. will actively protect should the need arise. Having such an entity on the ground in Iraq, operating under the extended security umbrella of the U.S., is seen by Baghdad as affording it another level of strategic deterrent to attacks from Iran and its proxy groups. With Chevron on the ground, Iraq expects more U.S. firms to follow, which is part of its push to secure crucial diplomatic goodwill in Washington at a moment when it desperately needs U.S. waivers, financial access, and support for alternative export routes as well.
This aligns with the directive issued in late June 2026 -- backed by an earlier internal cabinet order that same month -- in which Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi explicitly instructed the ministries of oil, electricity, and communications to give top priority to American companies. Around the same time, as analysed in full by OilPrice.com, U.S. President Donald Trump met with al-Zaidi at the White House during the Iraqi leader’s five-day official U.S. visit, during which 48 agreements were signed between the two countries, valued at over USD60 billion, featuring companies such as Chevron, ExxonMobil, Halliburton, KBR, GE Vernova, and Starlink.
By Simon Watkins for Oilprice.com
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